Public policies and changing boundaries of firms in a “history-friendly” model of the co-evolution of the computer and semiconductor industries by Malerba, Franco et al.
Open Research Online
The Open University’s repository of research publications
and other research outputs
Public policies and changing boundaries of firms in a
“history-friendly” model of the co-evolution of the
computer and semiconductor industries
Journal Item
How to cite:
Malerba, Franco; Nelson, Richard; Orsenigo, Luigi and Winter, Sidney (2008). Public policies and changing
boundaries of firms in a “history-friendly” model of the co-evolution of the computer and semiconductor industries.
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 67(2) pp. 355–380.
For guidance on citations see FAQs.
c© 2008 Elsevier B.V.
Version: Accepted Manuscript
Link(s) to article on publisher’s website:
http://dx.doi.org/doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2006.10.010
Copyright and Moral Rights for the articles on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright
owners. For more information on Open Research Online’s data policy on reuse of materials please consult the policies
page.
oro.open.ac.uk
PUBLIC POLICIES AND CHANGING BOUNDARIES OF FIRMS  
IN A "HISTORY FRIENDLY" MODEL  
OF THE CO-EVOLUTION  
OF THE COMPUTER AND SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRIES 
 
 
 
 
Franco Malerba*, Richard Nelson**,  Luigi Orsenigo*** 
and Sidney Winter**** 
 
 
*Bocconi University and CESPRI, Milan, Italy 
** Columbia University, New York, USA 
***Brescia University and CESPRI, Milan, Italy 
**** The Wharton School, Philadelphia, USA 
 
In this paper, we explore the effects of alternative policies, ranging from antitrust to public 
procurement, open standards, information diffusion and basic research support on the 
dynamics of two vertically related industries in changing and uncertain technological and 
market environments. The two industries are a system industry and a component industry, and 
the evolution of these industries is characterized by periods of technological revolutions 
punctuating periods of relative technological stability and smooth technical progress. We 
have been inspired by the co-evolution of the computer and component industries from their 
inceptions to the 1980s. On the basis of that evolution, we have developed a history friendlymodel 
this co-evolution. In sum, this paper has stressed that various types of policies may 
sometimes have contrasting effects on the industry, mainly on concentration and technical 
change and innovation. It has also shown that the consequences of policies may spillover 
from one industry to another, and from one type of firms to another. Policies that aim at a 
specific industry may provoke major changes in a related industry through the product market, 
the changing boundaries of firms or knowledge and technological interdependencies. The 
policy maker has to be aware of that. Finally, a major point of the paper regards the 
unintended consequences of policies. 
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1.  Introduction 
 This paper examines the effects of different types of public policies - ranging from antitrust to 
public procurement, open standards, information diffusion and basic research support - on the co-
evolution of two, vertically related industries in changing and uncertain technological and market 
environments. It does so by focussing on the specific cases of the computer and semiconductor 
industries and relying on a “history-friendly” model of the co-evolution of these two industries.  
 We concentrate on the dynamics of mainframes and personal computers and of the main 
generations of semiconductors used in computers: first transistors, then integrated circuits and finally 
microprocessors. The co-evolution of these two industries has shown periods of  incremental technical 
progress punctuated by major discontinuities related to the introduction of a new type of computers 
(personal computers vs. mainframes) and semiconductors (integrated circuits vs. transistors and later 
microprocessors vs. integrated circuits). The coupled dynamics of the two industries has involved 
processes of integration and specialization by computer producers. 
 In the dynamics of the two industries, public policy intervened at different levels. First of all 
antitrust policy tried to act against IBM. But other policies were used in these industries: public 
procurement (e.g. military expenditures in the USA for early mainframes and for transistors and 
integrated circuits in semiconductors, or  NASA policies); support of basic research in computers; 
attempts at favouring the diffusion of technological information; interventions promoting the entry of 
new firms (as done by many Governments in Europe, United States and Japan along the history of the 
industry).  
 In this paper we examine the effects of these policies on the dynamics of concentration and on 
the  rate of technical change. We do not directly address the desirability of these policies1. Rather, 
we examine the effects of  alternative forms of public intervention in dynamic, evolving and 
interacting markets. To anticipate the results, we show that different policies have quite different 
effects – or no effect at all - on some key policy targets such as market power or rate of technical 
progress; that there are major inter-industry effects of policies, transmitted vertically and horizontally 
across markets; and that the unintended consequences of policies may be significant. The degrees of 
efficacy of policies depend on the specific nature of the dynamic processes driving industry 
evolution, particularly as it concerns the existence and strength of increasing returns on the supply 
and demand side and on the nature of the feedback reactions governing the coupled dynamics of 
vertically and horizontally related industries.   
                                                 
1 We are also perfectly aware that  possession of market power is in itself not objectionable under antitrust policy. Thus, in 
principle, we should explicitly model and examine anticompetitive behaviour. For simplicity, though,  we analyze only the 
effects of antitrust policy, as if monopoly power implied anticompetitive behaviour. 
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 The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets the conceptual background by briefly 
discussing problems that arise in the analysis of the effects of public policies in dynamic settings 
and the methodology of history friendly models used in this paper.  Section 3 introduces a short 
history of the industries and the policies that the model purports to explain. Section 4 presents an 
outline of the crucial features of the model, while Section 5  examines our benchmark simulation, 
i.e. the “history-friendly” runs. Then section 6 broadly introduces the  effects of alternative policies 
in a dynamic co-evolutionary setting, while section 7 presents a series of exercises regarding  
alternative forms of intervention on the evolution of market structure and on technological change 
in the computer and semiconductor industries. Finally,  section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Industrial policies in co-evolving interrelated industries 
 
2.1 The background 
 The analysis of the effects of industrial policies is often based on static, equilibrium models, with 
agents characterized by complete rationality. Moreover, such analyses consider in most cases, one 
specific industry, without fully taking into account the effects that public intervention might bear on 
related industries. 
 More recently, the growing literature on industrial dynamics and evolution has emphasized the 
subtle issues that arise when explicit dynamics, heterogeneous agents, increasing returns of various 
sorts and path-dependency figure prominently in the analysis. This literature has produced a substantial 
body of new results and it has deeply transformed the way in which industries are studied. Yet, even 
within this literature, policy implications have been by and large neglected, particularly as formal 
models are concerned. 
 Some major exceptions are to be found, of course, in the antitrust debate as it concerns the static 
vs. dynamic Schumpeterian efficiency trade-off  between innovation and monopoly power; and – more 
recently – the dilemmas posed by  network externalities. Audretsch, Baumol and Burke (2001) and 
Ellig and Lin (2001) provide a thorough verbal discussion of the main issues involved in competition 
policies in dynamic markets. And notably, these issues have been recently at the centre of the 
Microsoft case and of the ensuing debate (Gilbert and Katz, 2001).  The main issues raised in these 
strands of the discussion have focused on the desirability of antitrust sanction of monopolistic positions 
in industries characterized by network externalities and increasing returns to adoption as well as on the 
appropriate methods for preventing further exploitation of anti-competitive behaviour. In these cases, it 
is argued, competition is not within the market, but for the market and it manifests itself as a series of 
temporary monopolies, provided that the entry of new  potential monopolists offering potentially 
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superior new technologies is not blockaded (Schmalensee, 1999). Thus, antitrust policies should 
consider not only the immediate effects of the existence of a monopolist and of its actions but also the  
predictions of alternative possible futures (which might be very hard to predict indeed) (Ellig and Lin, 
2001). Discussion has concerned also the possible remedies, contrasting so-called conduct remedies 
(which attempt at constraining anticompetitive behaviour also in the future, e.g. use of exclusive 
contracts) with structural remedies (which create conditions within the market that would limit 
monopolistic power, e.g. divestiture of a monopolist into two smaller companies). While the former 
require heavy regulatory oversight and are susceptible to strategic intervention by competitors, the 
latter may fail if the required structure does not reflect an efficient organization of the industry. 
Moreover, structural remedies are likely to entail substantial costs of reorganization and they might 
impose indirect costs through their effects on the abilities of the new companies’ abilities and 
incentives to cooperate, including pricing and product development (Gilbert and Katz, 2001). In all 
cases, it is widely recognized that the competitive dynamics of industries “challenges the ability of 
economic analysis to make precise and certain predictions about competitive effects” (Gilbert and 
Katz, 2001, p. 43).  
        Another policy area that has attracted the interest of researcher in the recent past within the 
context of evolutionary and dynamic models of competition concerns the effects of alternative 
intellectual property regimes (see Winter, 1993 and Yildizoglu and Vallè, 2005, among others). Other 
studies have focused instead on the design of appropriate market designs, especially as it concerns the 
electricity markets in ACE (Agent Based Computational Economies) settings as well in game-theoretic 
models (see Amin 2002; Widergren, Sun and Tesfatsion, 2006, for surveys of these efforts). 
 However, many other questions remain open and largely unexplored. They concern not also  the 
desirability of intervention but also the efficacy of alternative policy measures designed not only to 
combat monopoly (if deemed appropriate on efficiency and political grounds) but also to promote 
industry growth and technological change. In general, little is known about the efficacy of industrial 
policies in dynamically related, co-evolving industries. 
  The joint recognition of the evolutionary character of economic processes and the 
interdependence between industries justifies and calls for analyses where the dynamic effects of those 
policies on the co-evolution of the industry and of the related sectors become the center of the analysis. 
This is what this paper aims to do by using  a history friendly model of the evolution of the computer 
and semiconductor industries.   
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2.2 The methodology: history-friendly models   
 In this paper, we start to explore some of these tangled issues. Given the complex and often non 
linear nature of the relationships involved among the main variables, a simulation model is in our view 
an appropriate tool for such an analysis (For recent discussions, see Tesfatsion (2003), Windrum 
(2005), Dawid (2006)) . To do this, we use a modified version of a previous paper on the co-evolution 
of the computer and semiconductor industries (Malerba et al, 2006). That model had been built 
following the “history-friendly” approach (Malerba et al, 1999). The logic and the objectives of this 
class of models has been presented and discussed in several occasions (Malerba et al, 1999, Malerba et 
al, 2002, Malerba et al, 2005). Suffice it to remind it here that “history-friendly” models attempt to 
formalize the verbal appreciative theories about the main factors explaining the particular pattern of 
evolution of an industry or technology put forth by empirical scholars of that industry. Thus, these 
models tend to incorporate more industry specific details than is customary of models built by 
economists. Modelling the history of an industry necessarily implies a more rigorous dialogue with 
empirical evidence and with non-formal explanations of those histories, i.e. with “appreciative 
theorizing”. The researcher is forced to spell out in a satisfactorily detailed way the hypotheses used as 
bases for an "appreciative" explanation of the evolution of a certain sector. This allows testing the 
robustness of those assumptions, clarifying the key hypotheses and causal mechanisms, identifying 
variables and relationships that were not adequately considered in non-formal models.  
It is worth emphasizing that it is not the purpose of history-friendly modelling to produce 
simulations that closely match the quantitative values observed in the historical episode under 
investigation.  The goal is to match overall patterns in qualitative features, particularly the trend 
behavior of the key descriptors of industry structure and performance that any industrial organization 
study would typically focus upon.  Further, the goal is to achieve this in a manner that features some 
particular causal mechanisms – namely, those that have been proposed in the appreciative theories that 
have been put forward in connection with empirical studies of the historical episode.  Finally, history-
friendly models can also be viewed in abstraction from the motivating historical episode; like any 
formal model they seek to elucidate the joint consequences of some collection of plausible causal 
mechanisms.  In that perspective, they are extensions of other history-free evolutionary models in the 
literature, both simulation models and analytical ones.  They have results of a “comparative statics” or 
“comparative dynamics” kind that may be interesting in their own right. 
Just as we do not attempt detailed quantitative matching to historical data, we also do not 
attempt detailed calibration of parameters.  This does not mean that we are indifferent to plausibility, or 
reckless in the choices we make.  Because most parameters fall into groups with a particular 
mechanism in the model, there is typically some common-sense guidance available for choosing 
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plausible orders of magnitude – there is some reality-based impression of how that mechanism ought to 
behave.  Many value choices for parameters involve implicit unit choices for variables, which means 
that the quantitative values are in the end arbitrary (or matters of convenience), but also means that 
relations among parameters affecting the behavior of the same variables have to be made with a view 
to consistency.   It does not matter, for example, what range of numerical values represents the 
aggregate value of sales in our model industry, but the relationship of production costs or R&D 
spending to that sales total does matter.  Further, some parameter values correspond to elasticities, 
which means that the choice of values is framed by the known qualitative significance of elasticity = 1. 
Finally, an additional constraint disciplining and orienting the choice of parameters values is provided 
by the time structure of the model. History-friendly models purport to generate sequences of events 
that take place in (approximations to) real time. And the definition of what “one period” means in real 
time (six months in this model) is crucial for establishing which actions take place at any one period, 
which follow, etc.. Hence, the time structure of the model imposes restrictions in order to respect 
consistency. Thus, for example, an interest rate equal to 3% on a yearly basis requires other important 
parameters in the model to conform to the specified time structure. 
Moreover, the methodology of "history friendly" involves both establishing some runs that 
match the qualitative features of  the historical patterns that the analysis is about, and some runs that do 
not match the historical patterns. Thus, to explore within a the model the proposition that e.g. a major 
reason an industry became concentrated is that there was a strong bandwagon effect on the demand 
side (due for instance to brand loyalty), the model must both be able to generate developing 
concentration with certain parameter values, and also generate time paths with far less concentration 
when the "bandwagon" parameter, or set of them, is set significantly smaller. In history friendly it is 
vital that one is able to identify some settings of parameters as significantly higher or lower than the 
parameter values that generate runs similar to the historical experience. Much of the choice of 
parameter values is oriented by the need to make these kinds of comparisons. 
  The computer and semiconductor industries provide also a useful empirical reference for 
grounding our discussion.  We concentrate on the dynamics of mainframes and personal computers 
and the main generations of semiconductors used in computers: first transistors, then integrated circuits 
and finally microprocessors. The co-evolution of these two industries has shown periods of  
incremental technical progress punctuated by major discontinuities related to the introduction of a new 
type of computers (personal computers vs. mainframes) and semiconductors (integrated circuits vs. 
transistors and later microprocessors vs. integrated circuits). The coupled dynamics of the two 
industries has seen processes of integration and specialization by computer producers, in which IBM 
has played a major role. Moreover, in the dynamics of the two industries, public policy intervened at 
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different levels. Antitrust policy with respect to IBM is an obvious example. But other policies have 
been used in these industries, ranging from public procurement (e.g. military expenditure in the USA 
for early mainframes and for transistors and integrated circuits in semiconductors, or  NASA policies) 
to support of basic research in computers (as done by many Governments in Europe, United States and 
Japan along the history of the industry).  
  However, this paper uses a history-friendly model as a basis for exploring  more theoretically 
oriented issues. Thus, after replicating the history of the computer and semiconductor industries and 
looking at the effect of policies in the history-friendly setting, we subsequently change the model – 
both simplifying it and adding new assumptions and features- in order to examine in more detail 
problems that might have a broader theoretical interest. 
   
 
3. The Evolution of the Computer and semiconductor industries and the role of public policies  
This paper is inspired by the evolution of computer and semiconductor industries, and by the 
role of policy during this evolution. In particular, within computers we will look at the history of 
mainframe and personal computers, and within semiconductors we will concentrate on  transistors, 
integrated circuits and microprocessors. We will mainly focus mainly on the industry in the United 
States and the role of  public policy in that country. Only briefly we will mentioned developments in 
other countries such as  Europe and Japan. Given space constraints, in this section we can recount only 
a stylized history of the computer and the semiconductor industries and of public policies. The more 
interested reader may have a look at Malerba (1985), Flamm (1988), Langlois (1990), Bresnahan and 
Greenstein (1999), and Bresnahan and Malerba (1999) for a more detailed discussion.   
 The history of the computer industry shows continuous improvements in machines that serve 
particular groups of users –for example mainframes for large users and personal computers for 
individual uses - punctuated from time to time by the introduction of significant new semiconductor 
technologies – such as transistors, integrated circuits and microprocessors - which not only permitted 
the needs of existing users to be met better, but also opened up the possibility of designing machines 
that serve new classes of users whose needs could not be met using older technology.  In the United 
States these punctuations were associated with the entry of new firms into the computer and into the 
semiconductor industries.  This happened to a significant lesser degree in Europe, and hardly at all in 
Japan. 
     The evolution of the computer industry began in the 1940s with the early experimentation with 
computers few companies, universities and public research laboratories which culminated in computer 
designs sufficiently attractive to induce the production of the first computers and their purchase by 
large firms with massive computation tasks, as well as by scientific laboratories.  This opened the era 
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of mainframe computers.   The role of public policy was relevant in this stage.  During World War II 
and the years just after, Governments in several countries funded a number of projects with the aim of 
developing computers useful for Governmental purposes. Universities were also quite active in basic 
and applied research on computing and computers.  In the late 1940s and early 1950s a number of 
companies, in the United Sates as well as in Europe, began investing their own funds hoping to 
develop a computer sufficiently attractive to win the market of scientific laboratories, large firms, and 
other organizations who had large-scale computation needs.  The early 1950s saw the entry into the 
industry of IBM--then a major punched-card and tabulating machinery company, but with significant 
capabilities in electronic computing derived in good part from government R&D contracts--and the rest 
of the Bunch (Burrows, Univac Rand, NCR, Control Data, Honeywell), as well as GE and RCA.  
These companies differed in the strategies they took, and in their success in developing machines that 
would sell at a profit.  By the mid 1950s IBM began to pull ahead of the Bunch, and in the early 1960s  
it came to dominate the world market for accounting machines.   IBM dominated not only in the 
American market, but in Europe, and Japan.  A small-scale domestic industry was able to hold on in 
Europe, and later in Japan, only by virtue of a combination of government subsidy, a guaranteed 
government market, and protection. 
Along with the emergence and evolution of the early computer industry mainframe, a key role 
was played by the emergence and evolution of the semiconductor industry, because semiconductor 
technology allowed major improvements in mainframes, as well as contributed to create new computer 
types. In mainframes, transistors had been used since the early 1950s instead of vacuum tubes. They 
were produced by both new specialized (merchant) firms and large existing electronic producers. 
These developments enabled significant improvements in mainframe performance, and some reduction 
in cost.  The invention and development of integrated circuits enabled even further improvements in 
mainframe computers. With this major technological discontinuity, several new merchant 
semiconductor firms entered the industry, particularly in the United States. Also in this case, the  
American government - in particular the military and NASA - greatly supported technological change,  
entry of new firms and the growth of integrated circuit industry through public procurement and R&D 
support.  Integrated circuits opened the possibility of designing computers that had a considerable 
amount of power, and that could be produced at a much lower costs than mainframes: minicomputers. 
Minicomputers opened up a new demand class which had not been tapped by mainframes, which 
included medium-sized research laboratories, manufacturing firms, and some small businesses. IBM 
lagged in getting into minicomputers, and never achieved there the dominance it achieved in the 
mainframe market.  While the availability of integrated circuits provided an opportunity for European 
and Japanese firms to get into the minicomputer market, as in the earlier case with mainframes, firms 
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in Europe and Japan lagged.  American firms took a considerable fraction of the minicomputer market 
in Europe and Japan.  With the introduction of integrated circuits IBM became fully vertically 
integrated into semiconductors, first with a hybrid integrated circuit technology (SLT) and then with 
monolithic ones. As a vertically integrated company, during the 1960s IBM continued to enjoy a major 
market predominance in the world’s mainframe computer market.   
      An indirect influence on the industry was the governmental anti-trust suit carried on for more 
than a decade by the American Justice Department against IBM. In the mid-1960s the Justice 
Department undertook a suit against IBM for unfair business practices and it was sponsored by Control 
Data, one of the IBM competitors. The final  effect (that ended only in 1982) was to push IBM “to 
unbundle” its software and peripherals that before were sold together as a package to the costumers.  
The introduction of the microprocessor in the mid-1970s marked another punctuation in the history 
of the semiconductor and the computer industries. Microprocessors enabled significant improvements 
in mainframes. In addition they permitted the design of reasonably powerful computers that could be 
produced at low cost: personal computers. With microprocessors a wave of new merchant firms 
entered the semiconductor industry.  Some of them grew very rapidly and became large international 
firms such as Intel. New firms entered also the personal computer  industry:  these included 
prominently specialized PC design and manufacturing firms (such as Apple, Commodore, Tandy, and 
Compaq).  Established mainframe and minicomputer producers were slow in seeing the new market 
and the needs of users in that market.  Interestingly, when IBM did get into microcomputers, it did so 
with external alliances:  Microsoft for operating systems software, and Intel for microprocessors.  IBM 
strategy was to enter as a specialized company and establish a common standard in the market through 
the production of a successful microcomputer (the PC). In this respect, IBM decided to buy its own 
components, peripherals and software from outside suppliers instead to build them internally. In this 
way, however, Microsoft and Intel were able to conquer the respective software and microprocessor 
markets in few years. IBM did manage to seize a significant fraction of the personal computer market, 
but never was as dominant there as it had been in mainframes.  Just as in the case of minicomputers, in 
Europe and Japan  few firms entered.  And, except where there was heavy government protection or 
subsidy, American firms came to dominate domestic markets for personal computers. 
With the introduction of microprocessors and other types of semiconductor devices - such as  very 
large scale integrated circuits, and RAM and ROM memories - those computer producers that were 
vertically integrated (including IBM) exited more or less completely from large scale production of 
semiconductor components. Disintegration took place because the new demand for semiconductors 
coming from personal computer producers as well as from other uses and demand had grown greatly 
and in response to that a variety of highly advanced components were introduced by several merchant 
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microelectronics firms. In addition a key firm -Intel- emerged as the industry leader for 
microprocessors, thus determining a de-facto standard in the semiconductor industry to which 
computer producers complied. 
 In sum, during the evolution of semiconductor and computer industries public policy has intervened 
in various ways: public procurement, R&D support, antitrust, support for basic research  and protection 
of national champions (this last policy was mainly adopted in Europe). In the following pages we will 
examine the effects of alternative policy interventions which have or might have influenced the 
evolution of the computer and semiconductor industries. Before discussing these policies, we are going 
to present the basic structure of the model. 
 
4. The Model 
We cannot provide here a full account of the model. The reader is referred to Malerba et al. 
(2006) for a complete presentation of the formal model and for the details. 
 
      4.1 Computers 
 At the beginning of the simulation, a given number of firms enters the market and begin to design 
and sell computers. Computers are made by combining systems and components, i.e. semiconductors. 
The former are designed internally by computer producers while the latter can be also bought by 
specialised suppliers on the marketplace. The design of semiconductors is based on the available 
component technology, i.e. at the beginning, transistors, later on integrated circuits and subsequently 
microprocessors. A computer delivers to consumers  a mix of characteristics, cheapness (i.e. the 
inverse of price) and performance. Their combination defines the merit of design (Mod) of any 
particular brand of computers.  
 
4.2   Demand for computers 
Customers of computers are characterized by their preferences about these two attributes. In the 
model there are two customer groups, one consisting of “big firms” who are especially interested in 
performance, and care less about cheapness, and the other of “small users” who are especially 
concerned about cheapness, and who value performance less than do big firms. These differences in 
preferences show up in terms of how performance and cheapness “trade off” in terms of customer 
evaluation of merit. However, in this model “big firms” buy only mainframes and “small users” buy 
only microcomputers: the two markets are completely separated in this respect. Moreover, the market 
for microcomputers opens up only with the introduction of microprocessors. Before that, it is 
technically impossible to design microcomputers. 
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Each customer group (“big firms and “small users”) consists of a large number of heterogeneous 
subgroups2. Within a particular subgroup customers – a submarket - buy computers valuing its 
"merit", compared to other products. However, markets are characterized by frictions of various sorts, 
including imperfect information and sheer inertia in consumers behaviour, brand-loyalty (or lock-in) 
effects as well as sensitiveness to firms' marketing policies. In addition, network externalities are 
present: consumers – given their preferences - tend to buy products that have a larger market share. 
These factors are captured in a compact form by a “bandwagon effect”, i.e. the share of  computer 
brands in overall sub-markets at time t-1: the larger the share of the market that a product already 
holds, the greater the likelihood that a customer will consider that product. Finally, there is a stochastic 
element in consumers’ choices between different computers. 
 
4.3  The market for components 
At the beginning of the simulation and at the time of each technological discontinuity a new cohort 
of firms enters the market, producing components with the latest available technology. 
In each technological era the demand for components, faced by component specialized firms, 
comes from two sources. First, demand for components comes from users different from computer 
firms (e.g. consumer electronics, the military, the automobile industry, etc). The size of this  
external market is exogenous and different for each component technology.  This external market is 
modelled in the same as the computer market, i.e. there is a number of submarkets to which 
component firms may sell. A firm gets therefore probabilistically  a fraction of the total value of the 
external market as a function of its  merit of design and of its market share.   
 Second, demand for components comes from computer firms which have decided to outsource 
component production (specialized computer firms). 
 When a computer firm decides to outsource components production, it starts to scan the 
market for potential suppliers. Suppliers are chosen by computer firms on the basis of a ranking of 
the merit of design of the components produced by each supplier. Given uncertainty and imperfect 
information, this choice is partly stochastic. Moreover, as for of computers, the demand for 
components is influenced by bandwagon and lock-in effects. 
After having selected a particular supplier, the computer firm is contractually tied to this company 
for a certain number of periods. When this period expires, a new supplier might be selected, using the 
same procedure.  
 
 
                                                 
2These subgroups can be interpreted as collections of consumers having similar preferences or even as individual consumers. 
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4.4 Profits and prices and technological progress 
Firms’ sales determine their profits and their market shares. Prices are determined by adding a 
mark-up on production costs3.  
By investing profits in R&D, firms improve the merit of their products. R&D expenditures are 
calculated following a simple rule of thumb, i.e. a constant fraction of profits. Technical progress is 
modelled through the “double draw scheme” used in Nelson and Winter (1982). There are two draw 
schemes, one for the components and one for systems, which differ only as it concerns the mean and 
variance of the distributions from which draws are taken4. In each period firms draw the value of their 
merit of design from a normal distribution. The number of draws  that any one firm can take is set 
proportional to its R&D spending. In each period, the values of the Mod obtained through the firms’ 
draws are compared with the current merit of design, and the higher among these values is kept. Thus, 
more draws increase the likelihood to get a higher merit of design for both systems and components.  
The extent to which technical progress is possible for each firm, i.e. the mean of the distribution 
from which they draw, is defined as a linear combination of two variables: the level of publicly 
available knowledge (e.g.. published academic research, technical information available in specialized 
journals, etc..) and the value of the Mod achieved by the firm in the previous period: in other words, 
technological change is partly cumulative at the firm level. 
 
4.5 Technological discontinuities 
 Industry evolution is marked by technological discontinuities in component technology. At the 
beginning, transistors are used in mainframes. Then integrated circuits become exogenously available 
and after some time, microprocessors.  
When a new technology is introduced, a new public knowledge function becomes available. 
The initial level of the public knowledge associated to a new basic component technology is lower than 
that reached by current technology, but then it grows faster and after a certain time it overtakes the 
public knowledge of the older technology. As time goes by, the rate of growth of public knowledge 
                                                 
3 Costs are derived from the achieved Mod and – in the case of computers – they must be equal to the inverse of 
cheapness While the production costs of integrated computer producers are a function of the achieved Mod, the 
production costs of specialized producers are instead determined as the costs of the system plus the cost of buying the 
components on the marketplace, i.e. the price charged by the particular supplier from which the computer company is 
buying. In the model, we assume that an integrated and a specialized firm having the same computer Mod have also the 
same production costs for a computer. For a given component Mod, the cost of internally produced components is equal 
to the cost of the externally produced components. The additional costs that would be associated to the mark-up charged 
by component suppliers and which are   “saved” by an integrated firm - are invested in R&D by integrated producers 
and treated as a cost. 
 
4 Thus, integrated firms have two technical progress functions, while specialized computer firms and component firms have 
only one technical progress function, respectively for systems and for components 
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starts to slow down until it reaches its asymptotic level. An integrated computer firm decides to adopt 
the new technology when the mean of its own distribution becomes inferior to the level of the public 
knowledge of the new technology.  
 New component technologies  allow for the entry of new semiconductor firms. First, transistor 
firms enter. As they invest in R&D and the new technology improves, they will gradually become 
more efficient than competitors producing transistors, eventually displacing them. After some more 
time microprocessors are introduced and again new component firms enter the market. 
Microprocessors however make it possible not only to design better mainframes but also to design a 
new typology of computers which appeal to groups of customers relatively more interested in the 
cheapness rather than in the performance of the machines: microcomputers. A new generation of 
computer firms enters the industry, opening up the new market for microcomputers. 
 
4.6 Vertical integration and specialization 
    Over the evolution of the industry, computers producers may decide to vertically integrate into 
the design of components or to specialize buying semiconductors on the marketplace.   
 The decision to produce component in-house is driven by considerations related to the relative 
achievable quality of the components designed in-house as compared to those offered by the specialist 
suppliers. However, computer firms can only conjecture about the quality of the components they 
might end up designing. So, the decision to vertically integrate is led (probabilistically) by the relative 
size of computer firms vis-à-vis the largest component producer. If computer producers are larger 
enough as compared to extant suppliers, they can fund a much larger flow of  R&D expenditures and 
achieve better quality. Second, fears of supply shortages may induce vertical integration. This is likely 
to be the case if semiconductor firms are small. Third, the decision to vertically integrate depends 
probabilistically on the age of the component technology. In the early stages of development of the 
new technology, when specialized producers are likely to control the new technical developments of 
semiconductors, technical change is fast and comes from every quarter. Given the risks of getting stuck 
in an inferior trajectory, a computer producer  is not likely to vertically integrate; rather, firms would 
wait and see how the new technology develops. Instead, if the technology for designing and producing 
components is settled along relatively well defined and established trajectories, the probability that 
new, superior generations of components may be frequently invented by component suppliers is lower.  
 Integrated producers enjoy some coordination advantages as compared to specialized producers, 
because they can produce components tailored to their system. As a consequence, the productivity of 
their R&D efforts on components is enhanced as if it were augmented by a certain factor, or spillover.  
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The decision to specialize is not symmetrical to the decision to vertically integrate. It is driven 
probabilistically by a comparison between the merit of design of the components produced internally 
and the quality of the best component available on the market (Best Mod), which can be directly 
observed. Thus, a computer firm will probabilistically sign a contract with a specialized semiconductor 
producer when the latter is able to design better components. This is more likely to happen in the early 
stages of the development of a new component technology and as semiconductor producers grow big 
enough to sustain a high level of R&D expenditures. The process of selection of the component 
supplier has been already described in Section 3.3. After signing a contract, the computer producer is 
tied to the component firm for a given number of periods. But, after the established length of the 
contract has expired, a specialized computer firm may decide to change its supplier. A specialized 
computer producer checks if a better supplier is available than the current one.  If this is the case, a new 
supplier is chosen using again the rating mechanism described in the discussion of the demand module 
(Section 3.3).  
 
       4.7 Entry, exit and industrial dynamics 
As mentioned previously, a number of firms enters the computer and semiconductor industries, 
when a new component technology becomes available. Firms will compete and gain sales, profits and 
market shares as a function of their merit of design and of their current market share. By reinvesting 
profits in R&D firms can improve their products. Thus, some firms will grow and other will shrink. 
These processes entail increasing returns on both the supply and demand side: technical progress is 
partly cumulative at the firm level and the probability of selling products is boosted by the bandwagon 
effects captured by the current market share. The larger these effects, the faster will a firm become 
dominant in either or both the computer and semiconductor markets. 
Computer firms exit the market when their market share falls under a certain minimum threshold, 
which is a function of the market share that would have been held by  n equal firms at the beginning of 
the simulation. For the semiconductor producers the probability of exiting is an increasing function of 
the number of consecutive periods in which it does not sell to a computer producer. 
When a technological discontinuity appears, a new cohort of component firms enters competing 
with the older generation companies. In the initial stages, the quality of their products will be lower as 
compared to the incumbents. But, if the growth of public knowledge and the size of the external market 
are large enough, they will sooner or later displace the older generation. Otherwise, especially if the 
external market is small, new firms will not be able to produce competitive products and overcome the 
barriers posed by the bandwagon effects in demand. Similarly, integrated computer producers will 
adopt the new technology as soon as the level of the public knowledge is high enough.  
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Thus, the degree of concentration and the identity of industry leaders may change depending on the 
size of increasing returns on the supply and demand side, on the size of the external market for 
component producers and on the extent to which the new technology is superior to the old one.  
The introduction of microprocessors allows also for the entry of a new brand of computer 
producers and the opening of a new market, i.e. microcomputers. Again, depending on the extent of 
increasing returns in the various markets, a dominant firm may emerge. 
The relative growth of firms in the computer and semiconductor markets, and therefore the co-
evolution of the  degree of concentration in the two industries,  will also influence decisions to 
vertically integrate or specialise by computer producers, thereby creating a further feedback in the 
model.  
The decision of a computer producer to vertically integrate subtracts sales to component firms. 
Vertical integration will occur with a higher probability if a monopolist exists in the computer industry. 
If this missing demand is large – and this is the case of monopoly -and external markets are small, 
semiconductor firms will find it harder to make profits and to innovate. They will shrink, triggering 
further vertical integration by computer producers and in the end the component industry as a whole 
may even disappear. Conversely, a rapid growth of semiconductor firms, fuelled by the external market 
and/or by the demand of specialized computer producers, will allow faster innovation. This will create 
further incentives towards specialisation and further growth of component suppliers.  If increasing 
returns are strong, a monopolist will be likely to come to dominate the industry, selling to all computer 
firms. As a consequence, the merit of design of the computer producers will become less unequal, 
because all of them have access to the same components. Concentration might therefore decrease. 
The opening of the personal computer market adds a new twist to these patterns. Initially these new 
firms are quite small and, if the new producers of microprocessors enjoy a large external market and 
grow, they are likely to specialize creating a new demand for the component producers and fostering 
their further growth- and possibly the emergence of a monopolist. The personal computer industry 
might instead remains competitive. But, if increasing returns are high in this segment of the computer 
market, concentration will increase here too, possibly leading to disintegration..  
 
 
5. The benchmark simulation: the history friendly case    
 
 
5.1   Factors and basic mechanisms affecting the history of the industry 
 
In order to provide a setting where the effects of policies can be conceptualised and analysed in a 
sufficiently transparent way, we start from a particular parametrisation of the model.  Coherently with 
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the history-friendly approach, a natural candidate appears to be a setting that attempts at reproducing 
the main qualitative features of the historical evolution of the computer and semiconductor industries 
on the basis of the causal relationships that according to the historical accounts and the interpretative 
framework discussed earlier  (Sections 3 and 4) generated  them. Thus, the history-friendly simulation 
will constitute the bench-mark for our policy analysis.  
The story can be recounted in the following way. In the early stages of their evolution (transistor 
period), the two industries experienced a shake-out and concentration increased. In the computer 
sector, a company – IBM – soon gained the leadership and an almost monopolistic position. 
Concentration increased also in the component market, but no firm acquired a clear dominance. The 
rise of a monopolist in mainframes was sustained by significant “lock-in” effects on the demand side, 
which magnified early technological advantages and protected the leader from competition. The 
growth of the leader led quickly to vertical integration. Conversely, semiconductor producers could not 
exploit large lock-in effects in demand and the extent of the external market was not so big to spur an 
increase in their size comparable to that experienced by computer producers. Thus, a dominant firm 
semiconductor company did not emerge.  
When integrated circuits were introduced, new component producers entered the market 
mastering the new technology. However in the computer market, the large dominant company retained 
its monopoly power. It only faced pressures towards vertical disintegration, to the extent that new 
component firms were able to produce better components.  However, since the external market for 
semiconductors was still not large enough, specialized component producers remained relatively small 
and could not innovate as quickly as the computer leaders. Computer companies were also able to 
adopt integrated circuits technology very rapidly and thus they ended up producing in house again  
their own components.  
The third technological discontinuity – microprocessors and personal computers– involved 
instead different conditions. First, the new cohort of component producers could benefit from a much 
larger external market and could then invest more in R&D. Thus, they could grow quickly and  achieve 
high levels of quality. Second, lock-in effects in the demand for components – both in the computer 
market and in the external market - were much more significant in the case of microprocessors as 
compared to integrated circuits and transistors. As a consequence, a dominant component producer 
emerged in this era. Third, the introduction of microprocessors marked a sharp technological 
discontinuity, which allowed to design much better components than those based on integrated circuits. 
Thus, the new entrants could supply vastly superior products so that catching up by integrated 
mainframe producers was slower. Fourth, microprocessors made it possible to design and start selling a 
new – previously unattainable – type of computers:  personal computers. Thus, a whole new class of 
 16
customers, who attribute much more value to cheapness than to performance, started buying the new 
type of computers: the PC market opened up and grew rapidly. Quite soon a large dominant  
specialized microprocessor supplier began to emerge, as a consequence of the demand by PC makers 
and of the presence of large external market.  The rise of  a strong and large microprocessor firm  soon 
made it costly and risky for mainframe producers to continue to design and produce their own 
microprocessors.  This led to vertical disintegration also in the mainframe industry.  Fifth, lock-in 
effects on the demand side were less important in the case of PCs as compared to mainframes: hence, 
no PC producer could establish and maintain a dominant position becoming large enough compared to 
the leading microprocessor producer to make vertical integration reasonable. As a result, PC computer 
firms remained specialized.   
 
5.2   The history- friendly simulation 
In sum, the history-friendly simulation is based on the following assumptions on the relevant 
variables and parameters and on their values: the size of the external market is relatively small in the 
case of transistors and integrated circuits and significantly higher for microprocessors; lock-in effects 
in demand are very important for mainframes and much less so for microcomputers; demand for 
microprocessors is subject to much stronger lock-in effects as compared to transistors and integrated 
circuits; the introduction of microprocessors allows much higher improvements in component designs  
as compared to the older technology: this technological discontinuity is much sharper than the previous 
one. 
 
// FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE // 
 
Under this parametrization, this “bench-mark” simulation replicates the key aspects of the 
story. Figures 1 and 2 show averages over 100 runs5  of  the Herfindhal index and the integration ratio 
(the ratio of number of vertical integrated firms over the total number of firms in the industry).  A 
dominant firm emerges quickly in the mainframe (MF) industry and tends to become vertically 
integrated relatively early. In the semiconductor (CMP) industry, concentration rises as demand from 
computer producers exert selective pressures and firms leave the market. At the time of the 
introduction of integrated circuits (IC), new semiconductor companies enter the market and 
                                                 
5 We ran  100 simulations, as it is almost customary in the literature,  even if the variance of the results stabilizes at very low 
levels after 30 runs. To provide a rough idea of the magnitudes involved, the variation coefficients (standard deviation/mean) 
computed at the end of the simulation is equal respectively to .0001 for the Herfindahl index in the mainframe market, .03 
for the Herfindahl index in the PC market and to .13 for the Herfindahl index in the semiconductor market.  Similar values 
are obtained for the best and average merit of design. The variation coefficient is somewhat larger for the integration ratio, 
although it varies substantially over the periods of the simulation.  
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concentration drops sharply. However, the dominant mainframe firm remains vertically integrated, 
because the external market is not large enough to sustain a significant growth of the new entrants and 
of the quality of their components. The absence of a demand from the mainframe producer induces a 
shakeout  and concentration gradually begin to increase again in the semiconductor market.  When 
vertical integration is complete in the computer market, the semiconductor producers are left with no 
demand and exit this market. As a consequence, concentration falls to zero. The third technological 
discontinuity sets in motion a different story. Microprocessors (MP) constitute a major technological 
advance as compared to integrated circuit and a large external market supports significant 
improvements in the quality of the new components. Moreover, the PC market opens up, generating a 
substantial new demand and fuelling further advances in the merit of the components. As a 
consequence, the computer leader decides to specialize, adding a new large demand. Finally, lock-in 
effects in the demand for microprocessors are now significant. Hence, a dominant firm emerges also in 
the semiconductor market. The establishment of a monopoly in the supply of components contributes 
however to maintain competition in the PC market, since all firms get their microprocessors from the 
same source: concentration increases but no firm comes actually to dominate the market. In the last 
periods of the simulation, as the microprocessors technology matures, the incentives towards 
specialization become slightly less compelling and, in some simulations, the mainframe firm and some 
PC producers decide to vertically integrate6. 
 
 
6.   The effects of alternative policies in the model: some general remarks 
 
6.1  The effects of public policies in a dynamic co-evolutionary setting 
   
In a dynamic co-evolutionary setting such as the one examined in the history friendly model 
presented above, a first fundamental issue has to do with the dilemmas involved by the presence of 
path-dependency in the evolution of industries and technologies characterized by network externalities. 
As vividly illustrated by Paul David (David 1986), here the policy-maker can be described as a “Blind 
Giant” (small interventions in the early phases of  the development of competing technologies are 
likely to bear long-lasting and possibly permanent effects, as they push dynamics along one of the 
possible paths and towards one of the multiple equilibria); facing “narrow windows” of opportunities 
(policies can simply have no effects and/or be too costly if a specific, irreversible path has been already 
established itself). But monopolies generated by path-dependent processes can be weakened and even 
                                                 
6  We conducted analyses of variance,  sensitivity and robustness  on the history friendly simulation with satisfactory results. 
These results are reported in Malerba et al (2006)  
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destroyed if major technological discontinuities occur frequently enough and agents are sufficiently 
heterogeneous (Bassanini and Dosi 2006)7.  
     In a similar vein, in a previous paper concerning the evolution of the computer industry (Malerba et 
al. 1999) we examined the effects of the timing of antitrust policy. “Early” intervention had almost no 
effect in that model, because a new monopolist emerged very soon. “Late” intervention succeeded in 
generating a duopoly, because increasing returns on the supply side were fading away by that time. In 
general, anti-monopolistic action had only small and transitory effects. The reason of this “policy 
ineffectiveness” result lay in the strongly cumulative nature of the market. Small initial advantages 
tend to grow bigger over time and catching up is almost impossible. Leaders do not only have a 
“static” advantage: they run faster than laggards. Thus, traditional antitrust policies in a static 
equilibrium  framework are somehow designed to “leveling the playing field”. But this may not be 
sufficient. In order to get results, some form of “positive discrimination” may be necessary . That is to 
say, policies should make competitors able to run (much) faster than the monopolist, and not just  
remove static disadvantages. 
 Thus, understanding the efficacy of alternative policies characterized by both increasing returns 
on both the supply side (cumulative technological change at the firm level) and on the demand side 
(network externalities) coupled with sudden (and unexpected) technological discontinuities and 
heterogeneity in demand (presence of  differentiated preferences for products embodying different 
characteristics) is intrinsically difficult and important, both for theory and for practice. 
       On top of this discussion one has to notice that public policy should not be limited only to 
antitrust policies. Industries and firms are subject to other types of  relevant policies, which have a 
variety of effects on several industry and firm variables.  We just mentioned public procurement.  In 
the USA, public procurement has been acting in several occasions as a tool for fostering innovation 
and has had as indirect consequence the entry and growth of new highly innovative firms, although it 
has often not been considered as an explicit industrial policy. In Europe, several programs have been 
traditionally used for supporting firms’ competitiveness and innovativeness, either selectively or at the 
level of the industry as a whole. Other policies have been trying to affect the entry rates of new 
innovative firms in an industry. In addition support for  basic research and for  the diffusion of new 
technologies are also systematically used policies that may produce unexpected results. Also in these 
cases the side effects of policies could be relevant. Thus, for example, public procurement in an 
upstream sector might sustain the growth of specific companies and even the emergence of dominant 
                                                 
7 Bassanini and Dosi (2006) show that asymptotic patterns of the dynamics of competing technologies depend on the relative 
impact of unbounded increasing returns and the degree of heterogeneity of the population of adopters. Moreover, in a market 
characterised by high technological dynamism, technological shock can occur before convergence to the notional limit 
market share of the dominant technology has been actually approached. 
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firms. The presence of a monopolist in this industry might further impact on the downstream sector in 
ways that depend crucially on the specific nature of the linkages between technologies and firms in the 
two industries. Conversely, public procurement could allow for the growth of firms and new 
technologies which could not otherwise survive, leading to vertical disintegration in the upstream 
industry and perhaps stronger competition. 
Within the history-friendly model presented above, alternative policy interventions might have 
rather different effects according to the specific parametrization that is used. However, on the basis of 
both the history of the industries and of the discussion of the model, it is possible to identify a few 
crucial policy objectives, instruments, variables and processes that are likely to influence the 
transmission mechanism of policies and their effects. 
The key policy objectives are here competition and technological change. However, these two 
goals may well entail the classical Schumpeterian  trade-off, if large firms are more innovative than 
small ones. 
The policy instruments that we going to examine are those that figured prominently in the history 
of the computer and semiconductor industries. It is useful – and customary in the literature- to 
distinguish among interventions on the supply side and on the demand side. Supply side policies are  
support of basic research, diffusion of knowledge among firms, antitrust and actions favouring entry of 
new companies. Demand side interventions are support of open standards and public procurement. 
The main variables that in the model can affect the efficacy of these interventions are in turn:  
a) the strength of forces that create increasing returns, i.e. the degree of cumulativeness in 
technological change and the bandwagon effect on the demand side;  
b) the timing of the arrival of the technological discontinuities and their magnitude, i.e. how 
better they are and how fast they become superior as compared to the old technology;  
c) the degree of heterogeneity of agents, in particular  as it concerns consumers; 
d) the interactions between the upstream and downstream industries. 
 A first key set of factors is given by the forces that create increasing returns, i.e. the degree of 
cumulativeness in technological change and the bandwagon effect on the demand side. When the 
coefficients of these variables are high, tendencies towards monopoly are strong. Interventions to curb 
monopoly power that do not change the underlying conditions are likely to have at the very best only 
temporary effects, because the forces leading to concentration will continue to operate recreating quite 
soon new monopolists. Thus, support of   basic research- in the form of higher rates of growth of 
public knowledge- is likely in this case to increase the rate of technological change, but to have a very 
little impact on the degree of concentration, to the extent that knowledge is accessible to everybody. If 
anything, concentration might increase, since industry leaders can magnify their advantages through 
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higher innovative opportunities, and consequently  also the gap between best practice and average 
practice.  
 Under these conditions, antitrust intervention might be efficacious only –or mainly – in the sense 
of making monopoly power contestable, to the extent that the former monopolist is not able to regain 
dominance. As mentioned above in the general discussion, the timing of the intervention may be  
important in this respect. Early intervention might be likely to be more successful in displacing a 
dominant firm and in allowing competition to select a new leader. However, in practice, antitrust 
actions that take place before a monopolistic position has actually been attained are obviously very 
hard to justify.  
When technological change is highly cumulative and the bandwagon effect is strong, also policies 
supporting firms – either in favouring the entry of new firms are likely to be ineffective: entrants may 
find insurmountable barriers to their survival and growth, unless they are carriers of superior 
technologies, i.e. especially at times of technological discontinuities.  
Conversely, policies that weaken the sources of increasing returns are likely to be more effective. 
Thus, interventions aiming at favouring the diffusion of knowledge could limit the tendencies towards 
concentration because they attenuate one of the forces generating increasing returns: the ability of 
firms to take advantage of their innovations is reduced. Similarly, support to open standards – as it 
curbs bandwagon effects – should significantly impact on monopoly power.  The overall effect on the 
rate of technological change depends then on the size – if any –of the Schumpeterian trade-off. 
Both monopoly power and the rate of technical change can be deeply affected by the timing of 
arrival and by the magnitude of technological discontinuities. If  radical technological breakthroughs 
occur frequently, monopolistic positions are inherently threatened, at least unless industry leader are 
able to adopt quickly the new technology. However, the take-off and the subsequent diffusion of the 
new technologies depend on how better they are as compared to the old generation and on the 
existence of markets,  like external markets and/or consumers interested in the specific  features 
characterizing the new technology (such as cheapness rather than performance in our model). The 
external market and the microcomputer market might  allow the new technology to improve and 
become competitive. Thus, policies are likely to be more effective at times of technological ruptures, 
even though they might be less needed (monopolistic positions are already under threat) and more 
difficult to design (is the new technology really better than the old one?)  
  Finally, all these effects are crucially mediated by the feedbacks between the upstream and 
downstream industries, i.e. in the model the rules governing vertical integration and specialisation. 
These interactions determine how policies in one sector transmit their effects on the other.  Thus, as 
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argued previously in Section 2.1, policies directed towards one industry may induce consequences – 
sometimes unintended-  that might weaken or strengthen the initial effect. 
 
6.2  The indirect and the unintended consequences of policies 
 
        Issues become even more difficult  to examine  if one considers also the side-effects of policies on 
horizontally and vertically related sectors. Some of these “indirect” consequences may be hard to 
predict and surprising, but very important in practice and perhaps perverse in evolutionary, dynamic 
environments characterized by increasing returns and heterogeneous agents. In a previous paper 
(Malerba et al. 2005), we discussed for instance how the existence of heterogeneous consumers and of 
a horizontally related market (e.g. computers and PCs) can allow for the survival and eventual 
dominance of new, superior technologies that would otherwise have failed to take-off.  In this context  
public procurement can play the role of some of these (key) heterogeneous consumer and therefore be  
responsible  for the emergence of new superior technologies. 
 A similar issue refers to the unintended consequences of policies. For example, the destruction by 
policy of  a monopolistic position in a downstream  industry could entail the unintended consequence 
of bringing about the emergence of a new monopolist in an upstream sector which supplies 
components to the downstream industry. This might happen if increased competition in the upstream 
industry (consequent to e.g. the divestiture of the downstream monopolist) induced vertical 
disintegration and hence the rapid growth of a dominant upstream supplier, fueled by cumulative 
innovation and lock-in effects on the demand side.  Conversely, antitrust intervention might kill two 
birds with the same stone: the elimination of an  upstream monopolistic supplier could leave room for 
the growth of new products and technological solutions that allow new competitors to grow and 
challenge the dominant position of  a downstream monopolist.  There could be cases in which  the 
interaction between horizontally and vertically related markets might induce even more drastic 
consequences of policies, like the disappearance of an entire upstream industry. For example the 
elimination of a monopoly in the upstream industry which serves only a downstream market may 
induce vertical integration by all firms in the downstream industry and thus the elimination of the 
entire demand directed to the specialized upstream producers.  
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7.   The simulations of public policies in dynamic interdependent markets 
As mentioned previously in Section 6, the policies examined in this paper have the goal to increase 
the rate of technical change and/or to foster competition and reduce monopoly power. In the current 
parametrization of the model there is actually a Schumpeterian trade-off between the two objectives: 
larger firms can invest more in R&D, thereby increasing the chances to obtain technological 
improvements.  As mentioned earlier, we also distinguish supply side and demand side oriented 
policies.  
The first group – supply side policies – includes:  
A) higher support for public basic research, in order to increase the rate of technological change; 
B) fostering the diffusion of knowledge among firms, with the goal of  facilitating the access to 
knowledge and – possibly – to weaken the tendency towards monopoly; 
C) break monopolies, in order to foster competition;  
D) support the entry of new actors, so that a monopolistic position can be challenged.  
The second group – demand side policies – includes: 
E) support open standards so that lock –ins are avoided; 
F) use public procurement in a selective way, so that the most advanced technologies are 
supported;  
G) use public procurement as an additional market,  in order to provide larger markets and  
opportunities for firms’ growth and innovation.  
We will first examine these policies with reference to the benchmark (the history friendly) 
simulation.  
As mentioned above, we will examine the effects of policies on two policy targets: rate of 
technical change (in terms of best technology and average technological level in the industry) and  
market concentration. However we will also observe the changes in the boundaries of firms. These 
may not be a direct policy target; however a consequence of policies may have profound effects on the 
degree of vertical integration and specialization and thus affect the disappearance or growth of 
specialized firms. 
Policies may target the system industry (computers) or the component industry 
(semiconductors), or both. We will discuss the type of policy that present the most interesting results. 
Our exercises will report results of averages over 100 runs8. 
 
 
 
                                                 
8 Also for the policy simulations, we conducted analyses of variance, sensitivity and robustness. Results do not differ from 
the ones obtained for the history friendly simulation. 
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7.1   Policies on the supply side 
7.1.1    Support for basic research   
 Public policy may support public investments in basic research in the system and in the component 
industries. Results of advancements in basic research become available to all firms.   In the model, this 
is implemented by increasing the rate of growth of public knowledge in both system technology and 
component technology.  
 As expected,  the support for basic research  has a major effect on the technological performance of 
both the best technology (merit of design - Mod - in the language of our model) and the average 
technological level of the industry (average merit of design –AvMod- in the language of our model) of 
both computers and semiconductors increase compared to the standard case. (Figures are not reported 
here). As a consequence of the logic of our model, the gap between the best and average practice 
increases. 
 However, this intervention has no effect on concentration: higher levels and faster growth of public 
knowledge raise the basic opportunities for innovating, but increasing returns on the supply and 
demand side continue to create tendencies towards concentration9.  Thus, in the mainframe market, a 
monopolists emerges again quite soon, obtaining a higher level of merit of design in both its internally 
produced components and in its systems. Therefore, after each discontinuity in components (and 
particularly with microprocessors) the vertically integrated mainframe monopolist is able to remain 
integrated for a while – instead of specializing soon. Over time, however,  microprocessors produced 
by merchant producers driven by the PC market  and the external markets have a higher quality than 
the microprocessors produced internally by the vertically integrated mainframe producer and  lead the 
computer monopolist to disintegrate.  In the same vein, no changes in concentration appear in the 
personal computer market with respect to the benchmark simulation. 
 
7.1.2. Increase the diffusion of knowledge 
 Public policy may want to favor the diffusion of knowledge among firms within both the system 
and the component industries, so that a relatively high technological base is common to all system and 
component firms. In the model this policy is represented  by making technical change less cumulative 
at the firm level, so that the rate of growth of the merit of design depends mainly on the growth of the 
public knowledge10. 
                                                 
9 A fundamental result obtained in Nelson and Winter (1982) model was that higher innovative opportunities led to higher 
levels of concentration, because innovators could make bigger technological advances and on these bases obtain larger 
market shares. Cumulativeness in technological change compounded this effect. In our model, this effect is less visible 
simply because concentration is already extremely high.  
10   Literally, the implementation of the simulation has increased the role of public knowledge compared with private one, 
more than actually diffusing knowledge among firms.   
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     Not surprisingly, policies favoring knowledge diffusion have  indeed  the effect of reducing the gap 
between best and average practice and therefore also the overall level of concentration in the 
semiconductor market in the era of microprocessors and in the PC market (see Figure 3). To put it 
simply, an important source of increasing returns has been weakened. Yet, no effect on concentration 
appears in the mainframe industry, where monopoly continues to exist.  Here, the bandwagon effect is 
so strong that concentration remains unaffected.  
 However, these policies have also the effect of reducing  the rate of growth of both the average 
Mod and especially of the highest Mod of computer and component producers. Lower levels of 
cumulativeness imply that firms find it harder to do much better than public knowledge   This effect 
becomes particularly important as times goes by after each discontinuity has occurred, i.e. when 
cumulativeness in innovation begins to exert its impact.   
 
//  FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE // 
 
7.1.3 Antitrust policies on the supply side 
Antitrust policies have the aim of reducing a high level of concentration in the market.     In our 
model antitrust authority intervenes only once as soon as the monopolist reaches a share of 70% of the 
market11.  It acts by breaking the monopolist in two.  The two new firms originating from the old 
monopolists have half of the size and half of the resources of the previous monopolist. They maintain 
however the same position in terms of the merit of design of the previous monopolist.  In our model 
antitrust intervenes mainly in the system market (mainframes) and in the component market 
(microprocessors). 
Antitrust intervention does not have any effect on market concentration. The reason is that the 
new firms originating from the monopolist are still larger than competitors and have higher 
technological capabilities (merit of design). Thus, one of the two firms gains very quickly advantages 
over the other one, driven by the bandwagon effect in demand, and the  market concentrates quite soon 
again. Results (not reported here) show that the Herfindahl index, the average Mod and the boundaries 
of firms do not change with respect to the benchmark simulation.  
In the setting of this simulation, antitrust has only the effect of making monopoly contestable, 
even though a new monopolist still originates form the old one. In order to maintain competition, 
antitrust should intervene each time a firm gains a monopolistic position or even before that. This kind 
of behaviour would be in practice quite difficult to justify.  
 
                                                 
11 Given the feature of our model, the 70% share could be set higher or even somewhat lower without changing the features 
of the results.  
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7.1.4  Support for  entry of  new firms 
Policies may support the creation of  new firms (e.g. through programs funding  new risky 
initiatives) in order to increase competition  and to foster a variety of approaches to technological 
advance and product development. In our case, these policies are modelled in two ways: by doubling 
the number of  firms entering after each discontinuity in the computer and in the component market; or  
by having every forty periods twelve new firms entering each market.  In this latter case, new firms 
enter having the average merit of design present in the industry.  
The increase in the initial number of firms in the mainframes and in microprocessors markets 
does not provoke any  significant change with respect to the benchmark simulation,  in terms of both  
the rate of technical change and concentration. One leader emerges in any case, due to the bandwagon 
effect at the demand level and to cumulativeness of technical advances, although the initial growth in 
concentration is slower compared to the benchmark simulation.   The case of periodic entry generates 
different results in the microprocessor industry, but not in mainframes.  In microprocessors, periodic 
entry does not change the leadership of the largest firm, but reduces industry concentration by greatly 
increasing the number of firms that are active and survive in the industry (see Figures 4 and 5). The 
reason is that bandwagon effects are weaker than in the mainframe market and  the new emerging 
semiconductor leader cannot exploit from the beginning such a large market share as the one  already 
conquered by the mainframe monopolist. Hence, new entrants in the component markets compete with 
a leader which is still building its dominant position and they are therefore able to survive. The later 
cohorts of entrants, though, find it increasingly difficult to compete.  
This case illustrates the relevance of the timing of intervention and the subtleties  involved in 
this respect. In industries characterized by strong increasing returns, a larger initial number of firms can 
at its best slow down the process of monopolization, but it has no impact in the long run. Laggards will 
exit soon from the industry, as their merit and design and market share cannot grow much as compared 
to the leader. The result concerning continuous entry in the microprocessors market is more puzzling 
and interesting. Why  can instead the entry of new firms – as contrasted with an increase in the initial 
number of firms  - limit the tendencies towards monopoly even in the long run?  Given that increasing  
returns are sufficiently weak to allow for a gradual process of concentration, the early new cohorts of 
firms enter with a level of the merit of design which is higher than that attained by initial laggards and 
sufficiently high as compared to what has been achieved by the emerging leader, to provide them with 
a chance of surviving. Moreover the market size for microprocessors is  rather large, because it is 
composed by the demand coming from the specialized mainframe producers and PC producers, and by  
the external market, so that the  survival and growth of  successful new firms is possible. In simulations 
(not reported here)  where  the new cohorts of firms enter with a  merit of design lower than the 
 26
average, they will not in fact be able to survive. In any case, the latter cohorts of entrants are so small 
in terms of market shares as compared to the now established leader that they cannot compete any 
longer.  
On the contrary, no ma major change in concentration takes place in the personal computer 
industry and in the degree of vertical integration of computer producers. Finally, because new firms 
enter with an average mod, the average mod of the industry is slower that in the benchmark 
simulation12. 
FIGURES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE. 
 
7.2  Policies on the demand side  
7.2.1  Reduction of lock-ins and support for open standards 
 This type of policy on the demand side aims to break lock-ins effects and to promote open standard 
in both computers and components. In the model, the bandwagon effect – the main source of 
increasing returns and hence of concentration in the model - has been eliminated in both the computer 
and component markets. 
 The effects on concentration are significant. The Herfindhal index in both the mainframe and 
microprocessor markets drops significantly. As a consequence of the reduction in concentration in 
microprocessors, also concentration in personal computer is lower, because no microprocessor leader is 
present boosting the growth of some PC firms (although the difference is not as strong as in the case of 
mainframes (see Figure 6)).  
 Also the effects on the boundaries of firms are significant. The reduction in concentration in 
mainframes reduces the size of the leading computer firm and therefore also the degree of vertical 
integration (see Figure 7). 
 A consequence of this policy however is a reduction in the best and average merit of design of 
mainframes. In fact the leader is not big enough to support high R&D expenditures, and therefore 
technical advance is not so high as in the benchmark case.  
 This case illustrates the critical Schumpeterian trade-off between innovation and concentration 
involved also in a policy that aims to reduce demand lock-ins and support open standards. We shall  
come back to this issue in the next section.   
 
// FIGURES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE // 
                                                 
12 This discussion on entry did  not explicitly consider one of the key features of entry: the possibility that entry increases the 
variety of approaches in terms of  new compositions  in the  product characteristics space (in terms for example of  
cheapness and performance).  The current version of the model presented in this paper  does  not allow to test for this 
possibility without adding new complications. Such an analysis would require another paper. 
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 7.2.2   Selective public procurement  
 Public policy may also intervene through public procurement: for example, government agencies 
purchase components or computers from one specific firm in the market. In the simulation, this case is 
represented as a selective public procurement buying from the best component producer for a certain 
number of periods. Specifically, the government buys from the producer with the best merit of design 
for ten consecutive periods. We examine this policy particularly when a dominant leader does not 
exist. This is the case of transistors and integrated circuits.  In mainframes and  microprocessors a 
leader emerges and this policy would obviously amplify its advantages. 
 In components (transistors and integrated circuits) the result of this policy is a higher merit of 
design (in terms of best and in terms of average merit of design). However, the increase in the merit of 
design of the best semiconductor producer has also the additional effects of an increase of 
concentration in the component industry: this is again the Schumpeterian trade-off at work.  Higher 
concentration in components in turns leads to a decrease of vertical integration by mainframe 
producers, since the high merit of design  achieved as a consequence of public procurement by the best 
semiconductor producer induces some vertically integrated mainframe firms to specialize  (Figures 8, 9 
and 10). 
 In sum, selective public procurement has two effects on the market – an increase in the merit of 
design of semiconductors and an increase in the number and importance of specialized merchant 
producers in the component market-. However these two effects take place  at the expense of creating 
temporary monopolists in semiconductors.  
 When public procurement stops however, the leading mainframe producer regains a major size 
advantage over the component monopolist and vertical integration takes place again - as in the 
benchmark history friendly simulation. Thus, in this model public procurement has to be permanent in 
order to be effective on the merit of design and specialization.     
 
 
// FIGURES 8, 9 AND 10  ABOUT HERE// 
  
 
7.2.3  Permanent public procurement as an additional market    
 Compared to the previous one, a different public procurement policy is the creation by the 
government of a permanent additional demand for components. This additional demand is satisfied by 
competing firms in the industry. In this case, the government creates an “external” market which 
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represents an addition to the demand coming from computer producers. Again, for reason similar to the 
ones presented above, it is interesting to examine the effects of this type of policy in transistors and 
integrated circuits.   
 Results are striking. During the transistor period, when an external market is added, the mainframe 
industry is not highly concentrated yet and not strongly  vertically integrated. The result of this policy 
is to increase the survival of a higher number of transistor firms as compared to the benchmark case. 
 On the contrary, when an external market is added during the integrated circuit period, 
concentration in mainframes is already very high, with a leading monopolist. This large  firm  is 
already buying components from few component producers, who have become market leaders also due 
to their relationship with the mainframe monopolist.  The effect of public procurement is to reinforce 
the existing leadership in components, thereby increasing concentration in the component industry. 
Thus, the new additional market created by public procurement increases the merit of design and the 
size of the leading semiconductor producer. This in turn curbs the tendency to vertical integration of 
the mainframe monopolist, and fosters specialization in computers and in components (Figures 10, 11 
and 12) 
 
//  FIGURES 10, 11 AND 12 ABOUT  HERE // 
 
8.  The unintended consequences of public policy: some exercises 
 
8.1 The Schumpeterian trade off 
 A first type of  consequence  in the same industry  refers to the classic Schumpeterian trade-off. In 
industries with high technological opportunities and increasing returns, policies aiming at reducing 
market power or aiming at increasing the rate of technical change may reach their goals, but at the 
same time they may create a new policy problem. A reduction in market power (due to antitrust policy 
or other policy competition increasing) might be associated with a reduction in the rate of technical 
change because the size of the leading firm is greatly reduced, investments in R&D are lower and 
technological advance is consequently reduced. Similarly, policies aiming at increasing the rate of 
technical change by supporting the most innovative firms may end up generating market power and 
monopolies because the advantages given to the most innovative firms generate market power and lead 
to dominant positions in the market.  In our paper, cases of  Schumpeterian trade-offs have already 
been shown in the case of reductions of lock-ins at the demand level and selective public procurement 
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8.2  The creation of open standards in computers leads to the emergence of concentration  in 
components  
 However,  policies may have unintended consequences across horizontal and vertical markets due 
to  inter-industry interdependencies.   One example is the following.  Let’s suppose that a policy 
aiming at fostering open standards through the elimination of the bandwagon effects reduces 
concentration in all industries. However, lower concentration in mainframes may have as a 
consequence a reduction in vertical integration and an increase in the demand for microprocessors from 
the previously integrated large mainframe producers.  As a further consequence, a de-facto standard 
concerning the interfaces between components and systems might arise, showing itself in the form of 
the emergence of a bandwagon in component  demand. This market-driven increase in bandwagon in 
microprocessors created by the additional demand from large specialized computer producers may 
generate concentration in the microprocessor markets.  (Figures 13 and 14)  This is indeed an 
unintended consequence of policy. 
 
// FIGURES 13 AND 14 ABOUT HERE // 
 
 
8.3   Antitrust policy in computers leads to the emergence of a monopolist in a related system  
market and the disappearance of  a the merchant component industry. 
 Another case of unintended consequences may refer to the disappearance of a related industry as a 
consequence of public policy. If an antitrust policy breaks the mainframe monopolist in two and if one 
of the two producers diversifies into personal computers, a new large producer enters this industry with 
a relevant brand name. Because of its size, reputation and marketing capabilities, this producer is able 
to increase the level of the bandwagon effect in the personal computer industry and become the leader 
in this industry.  This is a first unintended consequence of public policy.  
 In addition, the new personal computer monopolist may become vertically integrated into 
microprocessors. This may lead to the disappearance of the microprocessor industry, if there are no 
other external markets for semiconductors. This is the second unintended consequence of the policy 
(Figures15 and16).  Thus, a policy intended to curb monopoly power in a system industry provokes the 
diversification of the ex-monopolist from one system industry to a related system, the creation of  
monopoly in that second system industry, a drive towards vertical integration and the total 
disappearance of the merchant component  industry. 
 
//  FIGURES 15 AND 16 ABOUT HERE  // 
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 8.4  Open standards in systems lead to the emergence of a merchant component industry  
 A final case refers to a policy intervention in a highly concentrated computer industry, 
characterized by high bandwagon effects in both the mainframes and personal computers markets. 
Therefore, the two industries are highly concentrated, with large firms that are vertically integrated.  
Let’s suppose that there is no external market for components: therefore no merchant  component 
industry is present (one could take the outcome described in Figure 15 and 16 as this initial situation of 
the industry). A policy of open standards in both mainframes and personal computers (which 
drastically decreases the bandwagon effect)  has the consequence (as seen before) of  increasing  
competition in the computer industries.  An unintended consequence of public policy however could be 
the following. The reduction of  concentration and the decrease of the size of the leading computer 
firms lead to a decrease of vertical integration and the switch to specialization by the system industry. 
The new demand coming from the now specialized computer producers create a new market for 
components and the emergence of an independent merchant component industry. (Figure 17 and 18) 
 
 
//  FIGURES 17 AND 18 ABOUT HERE // 
9. Conclusions  
 
This paper has examined the role of policy in dynamics, interdependent markets,  characterized 
by heterogeneous agents, cumulative technical advance at the firm level, major technological and 
demand discontinuities and  demand with lock-ins and network effects. We did that by using  a history-
friendly model of two related industries- computers and semiconductors.  Within this context we have 
explored the effectiveness of different types of public policies. 
In particular, we have shown that public policies on the supply side have  different (and 
contrasting) effects on the various policy targets.  We have shown that support for basic research 
increases industry technological performance. On the contrary, policies that favor the diffusion of 
knowledge reduce the gap between the best and the average practice in the industry, but also the 
growth of  the best design in the industry. Policies that favor the entry of new producers have the effect 
of decreasing concentration - but not of changing the market leader in the market - only if they take 
place on a continuous base. Antitrust policies do not have a major effect on concentration, because the 
rate of technological change coupled with strong bandwagon effects at the demand level soon recreates 
a monopolistic  situation.  In general, policies on the demand side seem to affect concentration more 
than supply side interventions. In particular, policies of open standards diminish lock-ins and reduce 
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concentration,  and at the same time  they increase firms specialization in the industry. Selective public 
procurement focusing on the best firm may indeed foster the development of products with a higher 
quality, but they  have long term effects only if they are done on a permanent basis. Public 
procurement acting as an additional “external” market for semiconductors increases product quality, 
and at the same time  increases specialization. 
We have also shown that in the same industry the side effects of policies might be  extremely 
relevant. The conventional Schumpeterian trade off between  technological change and industrial 
concentration is a first example. In industries that have the characteristics presented above the 
reduction of concentration usually implies a lower the rate of technical change. Relatedly, policies 
fostering a very high rate of technical advance may end up creating a highly concentrated industry. 
This represents a key policy dilemma in dynamic industries, that have to be examined with a finer 
grained analysis. 
Finally, we have  stressed the potential unintended consequences of public policy across 
horizontal and vertical markets. In dynamic interdependent markets policies that aim at a specific 
industry may provoke major changes in a related sector through the product market, the changing 
boundaries of firms and  technological interdependencies.   
Clearly, our results are very specific to the particular model that we have been using and to its 
parametrization. Different conclusions would be reached for  analyses of different industries and 
alternative models. In this respect, history friendly models offer – we believe – a useful starting point 
for discussions of the effects of policies in other sectors and – on these bases – for attempts at 
generalizations. However, even within the scope of the model used in this paper, this discussion 
highlights the complexity of policy analysis and design in dynamic, co-evolving markets.  Further 
work is needed to understand better these difficult but important issues. 
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Figure  1 – History Friendly simulation: Herfindahl index in mainframes MF, personal computers PC and 
components CMP 
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Figure  2 – History Friendly simulation: integration ratio  (ratio of  number of integrated firms over total number of 
firms)  
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Figure  3 – Increase the diffusion of knowledge: Herfindahl index 
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Figure  4 – Support for entry of new firms in microprocessors: Herfindahl index 
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Figure  5 – Support for entry of new firms in microprocessors MP: average Mod (avMod) and best mod (BEST 
MOD)  
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Figure  6 – Support for open standards: Herfindahl index 
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Figure  7 –  Support for open standards: integration ratio 
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Figure  8 – Selective public procurement in transistors and integrated circuits: Herfindahl index 
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Figure  9 – Selective public procurement in transistors and integrated circuits: best mod  
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Figure  10 -  Permanent and selective public procurement: integration ratio 
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Figure  11 – Permanent public procurement as an additional market: Herfindahl index 
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Figure  12 – Permanent public procurement as an additional market: average mod in transistors TR and integrated 
circuits IC eras 
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Figure  13 – Unintended consequences: open standards and concentration. Herfindahl index 
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Figure  14 – Unintended consequences: open standards and concentration.  Integration ratio 
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Figure  15 – Unintended consequences: antitrust, diversification and disappearance of  the component industry: 
Herfindahl index  
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Figure  16 – Unintended consequences: antitrust, diversification and disappearance of  the component industry. 
Integration ratio 
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Figure  17 – Unintended consequences: open standards lead to the emergence of a component industry.  Herfindahl 
index 
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Figure  18 – Unintended consequences: open standards lead to the emergence of a component industry. Integration 
ratio 
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